Afpak strategy: Prospects and problems

Afpak strategy: Prospects and problems
Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan
Upon completion of first 100 days in the office as the 44th President of United States of America, Mr. Barack Obama announced a new policy for managing the affairs of war ravaged Afghanistan and militancy-hit Pakistan; indeed the fallout of the Afghan hostilities. The strategy later was popularly known as the “AfPak” policy and had been hailed by leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan instantaneously, soon after its announcement. Mainly centred around the shared dealing of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the focal goal to dislocate, dismantle, and overpower the terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Taliban and to prevent their comeback in a future scenario by adopting a regional approach. The core of the policy as articulated by President Obama was that the soil of Afghanistan and Pakistan should not be used as a base to launch attacks against the US homeland and any developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan should not affect each other’s stability and efforts of purging away the al-Qaeda and Taliban. US special envoy, Mr. Richard Holbrooke has been assigned the exceptional responsibilities both in Pakistan and Afghanistan in connection with the stated policy for the subsequent resolution of the Afghan crises. By making a unified command under Holbrooke, President Obama might have thought to redo or correct whatever US could not do in the last eight years. Moreover, the US Afpak policy clearly indicated its concerns about the geopolitics of the region, the location of the Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is also reflective of its long-term interests in the region. Analysts, those viewing it as the “US Exit Strategy”, as also hinted by President Obama, while announcing the policy, might not have considered the indicators like reinforcement of existing force level with another 21,000 troops, which substantiate its long-term designs in the region. The policy further explains that within the ambit of the UN; United States would form a “new contact group for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, comprising all those having their stakes in the regional security. Apart from NATO and other US allies; Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran, Russia, India, and China would be forming part of the regional approach, crafted for the resolution of the appalling situation. At the outset, it sounds, as if the policy is a major shift in the American strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular and South Asia in general. But actually the policy is a mix of optimism and suspicions. While optimism arises out of US roadmap for the construction and development of employment opportunity zones along the Pak-Afghan border, the suspicions are the product of past policies. The optimism emphasizes on institutional buildup, their subsequent strengthening and finally enhancement of their capacities in both countries. For this purpose Kerry-Lugar bipartisan financial assistance package for Pakistan has already been approved by US. Afghanistan is otherwise receiving billions of US dollars in terms of financial assistance ever since 2001. Another optimistic feature of the policy is that through the involvement of regional countries US is promoting a multilateral approach to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. Moreover making Iran, an important stakeholder in Afghanistan as part of the approach would place some added responsibilities on latter’s internal stability. The suspicions and apprehensions included; would US be really interested in promoting the regional approach by giving away the sole authority, it enjoys as the only super power; a shift from unilateralism to multilateralism or else there are out of sight intentions attached to the AfPak Policy. Trepidation also surrounds that regional approach may further complicate the issue, as all regional players; the stake holders have their personal agendas which they would not like to give up for the sake of US ease and desires. More so, incorporation of India in the regional approach; being a geographically non-contiguous country to Afghanistan and having historical animosity with its western neighbour would seriously bother Pakistan; the most affected country during the entire Afghan turbulence, since 1979. Indeed through guaranteed US cooperation, India already has a deep involvement in the Afghan affairs in the garb of reconstruction and development of infrastructure. Pakistan has serious reservations and apprehensions of Indian role in the destabilization of its Balochistan province and FATA region. There are evidences with Pakistan that India along with some other regional and extra regional countries is providing training, weapons and equipment and unlimited finances to these terrorists in their anti-Pakistan terrorist activities. All aim to commit Pak Army along the Western borders and attrite it to the maximum so that it should not pose a threat or maintain a military balance on the eastern borders. The noteworthy question arise here that if regional approach deems so significant, then within the region Kashmir is even a much more older and grim issue; the fundamental cause of tension in South Asia, warranting immediate resolution as described by President Obama himself upon his victory on November 4, 2008. Why it has deliberately been excluded after correct identification, perhaps to please India; the new US strategic partner in the region. But history also reads aloud that putting Kashmir at the backburner would not bring a lasting peace in South Asia, even if the Afghan catastrophe was resolved through ambitious regional approach. US could have espoused of an unbiased policy to get the region rid of the “issues”, really hassling the stability of South Asia. Apart from Pakistan, China too has its serious reservations about rapidly increasing Indo-US ties and Indian involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia in its neighbourhood. While analyzing the regional approach through yet another angle, which provides flexibility for the time being, keep aside other enduring regional issues for the resolution of Afghan conflict. Even then there exists no commonalities of interest among the regional countries and between the regional and extra-regional players; which is considered to be a pre-requisite for the success of any such modus operandi. Two main regional powers namely; China and Russia may have unanimity in their policies for the exit of US from the region, as demonstrated during all SCO Summits, including the recently concluded one in Russia, but have varying interest in Afghanistan, Pakistan and neighbouring Central Asia. The case of India and Pakistan over Afghan affairs and many other regional issues are even staid. Even US does not share its interests with any other country including its NATO allies, who reluctantly support its military operations in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that under the uncertain environment prevalent because of extremism and terrorism in Pakistani and Afghan societies, there is a need to tackle the menace jointly, but the aspect of sovereignty and integrity of the states are to be maintained. Afghanistan, a war-torn country under foreign occupation cannot be equated with a sovereign nuclear power of the world. Pakistan still feed 2.5 million Afghan refugees in its own territory. Moreover except religion, Afghanistan and Pakistan have different backgrounds, culture and values. Therefore, the over ambitious and ambiguous AfPak policy needs to be reviewed and reconciled for a logical forward-thinking while taking historical context of both countries in view. The prevalent instability in Pakistan is because of Afghan conflict and major power’s deep involvement in the affairs of the region. Even if today international community arranges closure of Pak-Afghan border and start discouraging the conspiracies in Pakistan by other countries, Pakistan would become internally most stable and economically well off state without any foreign assistance like 1.5 billion annual aid in the world arena in a matter of few months.
Email: drmk_edu@yahoo.com